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THE PORTRAIT OF HOMER IN STRABO’S GEOGRAPHY
lawrence kim
trabo’s geography, as anyone who has perused it will know, is
suffused with a profound, nearly obsessive, interest in Homer. 1 The
desire to demonstrate Homer’s knowledge of geographical information at every turn (even where it seems prima facie unlikely) is matched
only by the determination with which Strabo “solves” notorious problems
of Homeric geography such as the location of Nestor’s Pylos or the identity
of the “Ethiopians divided in twain” visited by Poseidon. 2 Strabo’s concentration on such arcana, often to the exclusion of more properly “geographical”
material, has understandably exasperated many modern readers with different
ideas about what constitutes geography. On the other hand, the overwhelming geographical focus of his Homeric criticism has rendered his extensive
comments of only passing interest to scholars of ancient poetic criticism; at
best they provide evidence for the methodological principles of a writer “conditioned by the dominant position of Homer’s poetry in Greek life to regard
Homer as knowledgeable and trustworthy in matters of geography also.” 3
Recently, however, a more sophisticated understanding of the historical
(or temporal) dimensions of Strabo’s geographical project has better integrated his Homeric ﬁxation into the work as a whole. 4 We see now that his
reverence for Homer is linked to the importance of historical memory (palaia;
mnhvmh: 1.1.16) within his notion of geography. 5 If, as Katherine Clarke
writes, “the stories told about the past were precisely what gave a place its
present identity [to Strabo],” the stories told by Homer would naturally be

S

1. Homer is mentioned in the Geography’s opening paragraph, and nearly the entire ﬁrst book is taken
up with discussions of Homer’s geographical knowledge. The books on Greece (7–9) and northwestern
Asia Minor (12–13) are closely tied to discussions of the Catalogues of the Greeks and Trojans in Iliad 2.
For an introductory overview, see Dueck 2000, 31–40; Kahles (1976) surveys Strabo’s numerous Homeric
citations.
2. Nestor’s Pylos: 8.3.24–29 (see Biraschi 1994); Ethiopians divided in twain: 1.2.24–28.
3. Schenkeveld 1976, 63–64; cf. Engels 1999, 115–20. Schenkeveld is one of the few who have attempted
to analyze Strabo’s method of interpreting Homer in Book 1 in any detail. Very little work has been done
on the speciﬁcs of Strabo’s Homeric interpretation elsewhere in the Geography; a notable exception is the
important series of articles by Biraschi (1992, 1994, 2000).
4. Van Paassen (1957, 1–32) anticipates much of the recent work; Biraschi 1988; Clarke 1999, 245–93
(esp. 248–51).
5. A slightly different approach is found in Gabba (1982, 59–61), who sees both Strabo’s “high opinion
of Homer” and his contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ advocacy of classical models as evidence of
a “classicistic” revival in the Augustan period; cf. Desideri 1999.
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vital to his descriptions of those places. 6 In addition, interest in Homeric
geography could boast of a healthy intellectual lineage. 7 Geographical
problems had always been important to Homeric critics, and conversely a
desire to identify the cities, regions, and peoples of the heroic age had
informed geographical inquiry from its earliest stages. 8 In such a context,
Strabo’s claim that Homer was the founder of geography and his interest in
defending the accuracy of the poet’s information become more comprehensible, and indeed constitute integral parts of his project.
In this article, however, I am not so much interested in Strabo’s thoughts
about Homeric poetry or its content (the geographical data he believes it
preserves) as I am in the idiosyncratic and selective portrait of Homer that
he constructs in order to justify his faith in the poetry’s reliability. 9 In
the ﬁrst part of this article, I analyze this vision of Homer as outlined
in Geography 1.1.2 and expanded upon throughout the rest of Book 1.
Strabo’s Homer is not some Stoic sage, nor the blind and divinely inspired
mendicant of the biographical tradition, but very much a traveler, historian,
and (no surprise here) geographer who embodies the ideals embraced by
Strabo himself in his own work and self-image. Furthermore, I want to show
how, just as his geographical project is a conscious extension and reworking
of his forerunners, Strabo’s construction of Homer as historian and traveler
(and only incidentally as a poet) arises from his reading of the “Homer”
articulated at key points in the work of his great model and predecessor,
Polybius. 10 In part two, I turn to his famous debate with Eratosthenes on
Homer’s geographical knowledge, focusing on the important opening section
(1.2.3 5) to show how Strabo’s discussion of Homer’s didactic concerns
can perhaps be better understood as an extension of this new portrait of
Homer. Rather than an isolated argument about the purpose of poetry, this
debate, viewed in a geographical and historiographical context, forms an
essential part of Strabo’s attempt to cast Homer as the “founder” of geography by defending his erudition and “useful” objectives both characteristics
delineated earlier by Strabo as those of the ideal geographer.

6. Clarke 1999, 281; cf. Strabo 2.5.17: “And of these latter attributes [the geographer] should indicate
those which are able to persist for a long time, or else those which, although unable to persist, somehow
possess a certain distinction and fame [aßllwÍ d’ ejpifavneian me;n ejcouv saÍ tina; kaµ dovxan]; this fame by enduring
[paramevnousa] to later times, makes a work of man, even when it no longer exists, a kind of natural attribute
of a place [trovpon tina; sumfuhÅ]”; cf. also the remarks of Biraschi (1988).
7. Prontera 1993. As he notes, identiﬁcations of Homeric sites and peoples with their “real” counterparts—
e.g., Scheria with Kerkyra, the Hippomolgi with the Scythians—appear as early as Hesiod and ﬁgure frequently
in early prose writers.
8. The Hellenistic period saw a marked increase in scholarship devoted to such topics and the inevitable
debates to which they gave rise. In fact, Strabo is the major source for works such as Apollodorus of Athens’
commentary on the Catalogue of Ships or Demetrius of Scepsis’ thirty-book treatise on the Trojan Catalogue, as well as other material testifying to Homer’s signiﬁcance in Hellenistic cultural and intellectual
discourse; see Pfeiffer 1968, 249–51 and 257–63, respectively, with bibliography.
9. Aujac (1966, 34–36) provides a brief overview of Strabo’s picture of Homer; cf. Dueck 2000, 39.
10. Strabo’s ﬁrst work was a history (now lost) continuing that of Polybius (on which see Engels 1999,
59–114 with bibliography), and his Geography is deeply indebted to that author as well. On Polybius’ inﬂuence on Strabo, see Clarke 1999; Engels 1999, 145–65; Dueck 2000, 46–53.
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Strabo’s Homer and Polybius’ Ideal Historian
Homer: The Founder of Geography
The opening section of Strabo’s work (1.1.1 23) is simultaneously a deﬁnition and a defense of his geographical project; it professes to explain what
“geography” is by detailing the sort of training it requires, what its aims
should be, and what sort of readers it seeks, but in doing so gradually evolves
into an apology for the treatise in hand, which is “a serious work, worthy of
a philosopher.” 11 The initial half of this long methodological introduction
(1.1.2 11) is devoted to establishing Homer’s position as the ﬁrst geographer,
primarily by demonstrating the poet’s knowledge of “the remote ends [ta;
eß s cata] of the o√koumev n h, what surrounds it [ta; kuv klå], as well as the
regions around the Mediterranean Sea” (1.1.10). 12 The far-fetched interpretations of Homeric poetry that Strabo provides in this section to establish
rather obscure points, such as Homer’s awareness of Iberia (not mentioned
by name in his poems), or that “by the term aßrktoÍ [the constellation “the
Bear”] . . . he means to;n a˚rktikovn [the northern polar zone],” 13 have not endeared this section to scholars, but there is more at stake here than initially
meets the eye. After all, the positioning of an extended treatment of Homer
right at the beginning of his work suggests that the importance of Homer to
the Geography cannot be explained simply as a nod to an illustrious predecessor or an attempt to co-opt a cultural authority for a novel project. In
fact, the entire series of arguments rests on an explicit, detailed assumption
about what kind of man Homer was, presented right at the beginning of
Strabo’s discussion and gradually supplemented and clariﬁed throughout
the entire ﬁrst book. This suggests that Strabo knew very well that proving
Homer’s geographical knowledge was not enough to make him the ﬁrst
geographer only as an embodiment of those virtues proper to the geographical tevcnh can Homer rightly be called its “founder.” In fact, it is via
his description of Homer that Strabo manages to address a central issue that
he omits from his more explicit discussion of the “philosophical” nature of
geography, namely, the type of person a geographer should be. 14
But before we go any farther, we should look at Strabo’s sketch of Homer
(1.1.2):
kaµ prΩton o§ti ojrqΩÍ uÒpeilhvfamen kaµ hJme∂Í kaµ o¥ pro; hJmΩn w• n ejsti kaµ £IpparcoÍ
a˚rchgevthn eπnai thÅÍ gewgrafikhÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ £Omhron. o¶Í ou˚ movnon t¬Å kata; th;n poÇhsin
a˚ret¬Å pavntaÍ uÒperbevblhtai tou;Í pavlai kaµ tou;Í u§ steron, a˚lla; scedovn ti kaµ t¬Å kata;
11. 1.1.23. I discuss the second half (1.1.12–23) of this methodological preface below, in the second part
of this article. Translations of Strabo are taken, often modiﬁed, from Jones’ Loeb edition of Books 1–2
(1917) and, for 1.2.3–9, the more ﬂuent rendition of Russell and Winterbottom (1970, 300–305). For the
Greek I use the recent edition of Radt (2002).
12. See Aujac 1966, 20–26, for a succinct overview of this section.
13. Iberia: 1.1.4; the Bear: 1.1.6. The latter is part of Strabo’s solution to the problem (also solved by
Arist. Poet. 1461a20) caused by Homer’s claim (Il. 18.489; Od. 5.275) that the Bear alone of all the constellations never sets.
14. Siviglia (1987, 48) sees in Strabo’s grouping of Homer, Anaximander, and Hecataeus as the ﬁrst
geographers an idea of geography “as the expression of a fundamental attitude of the human spirit.”
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to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇç to;n politikovn, a˚f’ h•Í ou˚ movnon perµ ta;Í pravxeiÍ ejspouv dasen ejke∂noÍ
o§pwÍ o§ti pleÇstaÍ gnoÇh kaµ parad∫sei to∂Í u§steron ejsomevnoiÍ, a˚lla; kaµ ta; perµ tou; Í
tovpouÍ touv Í te kaq’ e§kasta kaµ tou; Í kata; suvmpasan th;n o√koumevnhn ghÅn te kaµ qavlat
tan: ou˚ ga;r a˙n mevcri tΩn ejscavtwn au˚thÅÍ peravtwn a˚fÇketo t¬Å mnhvm¬ kuvklå perii∫n.
I say that both I and those before me, one of whom was Hipparchus himself, correctly
regard Homer as the founder of the practice of geography. For Homer has surpassed
everyone, ancient and modern, not only in the excellence of his poetry, but also, I might
say, in his experience of all that pertains to public life. And from this experience he
eagerly pursued not only public affairs to the end that he might learn of as many of
them as possible and give an account of them to those who came after him, but also the
things about places, both on an individual basis and with regard to the whole o√koumevnh,
both land and sea. For otherwise he would not have gone to its farthest borders, encom
passing the whole of it in his description.

We should note several things here. First of all, Strabo distinguishes
Homer’s abilities as a poet (a˚reth; kata; th;n poÇhsin) from his experience of
public life (hJ kata; to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇa to;n politikovn). With poetic “excellence”
bracketed, 15 Strabo concentrates on Homer’s other assets: he is a man well
versed in the political life, who is keen to investigate “deeds” (perµ ta; Í
pravxeiÍ) in order to learn about as many of them as possible and pass his
knowledge down to future generations. And of course, included among the
things to be learned are geographical matters (ta; perµ tou;Í tovpouÍ) understood in the broadest sense. The Homer we see ﬂeshed out here is not an
inspired poet or inventive raconteur, but a learned, intrepid explorer who
has “gone to the farthest borders” of the world.
Strabo’s initial portrait of Homer emphasizes three interwoven qualities
that will be reiterated and further elaborated in the course of his discussion:
(a) his ejmpeirÇa, or experience, of life, from which he developed (b) his eagerness to learn, and (c) his willingness to travel great distances to learn about
“deeds” and “places.” In particular, these last two speak to a certain geographical desire that lies at the heart of Strabo’s conception of Homer, often
stressed throughout the Prolegomena, and rendered more notable by the use
of rare and unusual terminology. In 1.1.10, for instance, Strabo points to
Homer’s alleged description of the tides as “another proof of the same zealous
curiosity” (thÅÍ au˚thÅÍ filopragmosuv nhÍ) that he had alluded to a few pages
before, and at 1.2.29 Strabo speaks of the poet’s “love of learning” (to; fileÇdhmon), coupling it this time with his “love of travel” (to; filevkdhmon), using
two words that are unique to this text. 16 Strabo establishes the parameters
of the knowledge to which this desire is directed as he discusses Odysseus’
wanderings (1.2.13):
For we do not demand [zhtouÅ men] that the poet should have inquired accurately into each
particular [a˚kribΩÍ e§kasta puqevsqai], nor demand accuracy from him [par’ ejkeÇnou to;

15. On this term, see below and Biraschi 1984.
16. fileÇdhmon appears only in Strabo, here and at 1.1.23, 1.2.8 (twice), and 3.4.19; filevkdhmon only
here and at 2.3.5. The astrologer Vettius Valens (second century c.e.?) uses the cognates filekdhmhthvÍ and
filekdhmÇa.
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a˚kribevÍ]; yet even so, we surely are not entitled to assume that he composed the story
[rJayåde∂n] without having inquired at all [mhde; n pepusmev n on] about the wandering,
either as to where or how it occurred [mhvq’ o§pou mhvq’ o§pwÍ gegevnhtai].

The inclusion of o§pwÍ in addition to o§pou reminds us that Homer’s “learning by inquiry” (pepusmevnon) includes not only identifying the location of
Odysseus’ travels, but also ascertaining “how” the wanderings occurred.
Homer, as Strabo’s initial portrait (1.1.2) had already asserted, is concerned
with pravxeiÍ in addition to tovpoi a pairing that corresponds with Strabo’s
own professed interest in both geographical detail and the historical “deeds”
that took place in the sites that he discusses.
We see a similar emphasis on inquiry into both deeds and places when
Strabo turns to the poetry to prove the poet’s love of learning and travel:
“the poets show that the wisest [fronimwtavtouÍ] heroes were those who visited
many places and wandered [tou;Í a˚podhmhvsantaÍ pollacouÅ kaµ planhqevntaÍ];
for they hold it as a great thing to have ‘seen the cities and known the minds
of many men’ ” (pollΩn a˚nqr∫pwn √de∂n aßstea kaµ novon gnΩnai, Od. 1.3). 17
So Nestor, according to Strabo, “boasts [semnuv netai] of having lived among
the Lapiths” at Iliad 1.270, while Menelaus evinces pride in his travels at
Odyssey 4.83, and often takes care to mention “the distinctive peculiarity”
(to; √dÇwma) of the places he has visited. 18 In each of these citations, the connection between travel and knowledge or wisdom is emphasized; the heroes
demonstrate an interest both in foreign lands and in what occurs there. In a
ﬁnal example, Strabo claims that “it is likely [e√kovÍ] that Heracles is spoken
of [by Homer] as ‘familiar with great deeds’ (megavlwn ejpiÇstora eßrgwn,
Od. 21.26) from his wide experience and inquiry” (a˚po; thÅÍ pollhÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ
te kaµ ¥storÇaÍ lecqhÅnai, 1.1.16). Note here, after the citations of the geographical interests of heroes, how Strabo extends the connotation of the
Homeric hapax ejpiÇstora beyond the notion of ¥storÇa (inquiry) to encompass also the ejmpeirÇa that he assumes lies behind Heracles’ knowledge. 19
Inferring Homer’s character from the sentiments expressed in his poetry, as
Strabo does here, was a common method of ancient biographical inquiry, 20
a fact that should remind us that Strabo’s vision of Homer as traveler and investigator was not completely novel. 21 Strabo himself claims that “all those
who have written about Homer’s life testify” (marturouÅ sin o§soi to;n bÇon

17. 1.1.16. Translations of Homer are those of Lattimore. Schol. E ad Od. 1.3 Dindorf echoes Strabo’s
interpretation of this passage; after explaining that there are three types of nouÅ Í (qewrhtikovÍ, fusikovÍ, and
pragmatikovÍ), the scholiast deﬁnes the “practical” sort as “whenever someone, having seen many cities
and countries and thereby becoming experienced [eßmpeiroÍ], obtains knowledge [gnΩsiÍ] from them; for
knowledge is obtained from experience [ejk thÅÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ].”
18. 1.1.16: “So too Menelaus: ‘I roamed over Cyprus, Phoenicia and Egypt, and came to the Ethiopians,
Sidonians, Erembians and Libya’ [Od. 4.83].” Among the peculiarities are the birth cycles of sheep in
Libya, the herbs of Egypt (Od. 4.229), and the gates of Egyptian Thebes (Il. 9.383). Van Paassen (1957,
17–18) has noted Strabo’s interest in the “particularity” (hJ √diov t hÍ) of a place as well as its central importance to his notion of geography.
19. The meaning of ejpiÇstora is still debated; cf. Russo et al. 1992, 151.
20. See Lefkowitz 1981 and Fairweather 1974, 1983.
21. And of course the association of travel and knowledge was a familiar one in Greek culture at large;
Solon’s journeys are a good example.
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a˚nagravfousi, 1.2.29) to his eagerness for travel and knowledge, and the
Homeric Vitae bear traces of such interest. 22 The Herodotean life, for example, tells us that a certain Mentes (intriguingly described as polui?stwr)
allowed Homer to accompany him on his ship, and that “wherever they
landed, [Homer] saw clearly all of the local customs and he learned of
them by inquiry” (kaµ o§pou eJkavstote a˚fÇkoito pavnta ta; ejpic∫ria diewraÅto,
kaµ ¥storevwn ejpunqavneto). 23 The emphasis not only on travel, but on Homer’s
desire to investigate, question, and learn things closely parallels the image
Strabo provides us, as does the choice of vocabulary. The Vita of Proclus
suggests that such notions were probably derived from the Odyssey’s
breadth of geographical scope (Proclus Chrestomathia, pp. 101.21 102.2
Allen):
It is evident from Homer’s detailed knowledge of places that he traveled over a great
part of the inhabited world [polla; de; ejpelhluqw; Í mevrh thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ ejk thÅÍ polu
peirÇaÍ tΩn tovpwn euJrÇsketai]. It may further be deduced from this that there was
plenty of money at his disposal. For long journeys involve great expenditure, all the
more so in that period when it was not possible for everyone to sail without risk, and
when men could not easily visit just any people they pleased. 24

Proclus’ deadpan “economic” inference also shows us that very different
conclusions could be drawn from similar starting points. 25 Even, then, if
the idea of an intrepid Homer is not particularly new, what is quite striking
is Strabo’s radical transformation of this minor biographical datum into
the focal point of Homer’s life and character. Furthermore, the rest of
Strabo’s vision betrays a rather deliberate neglect of the more celebrated
aspects of the poet’s life. In popular tradition, of course, Homer was a blind
poet, often poor, occasionally divinely inspired, who wandered the Mediterranean literally singing for his supper a picture considerably at odds
with the one Strabo puts on display. 26 And while his travels and inquiry are
mentioned in the two Lives discussed above, the shorter biographies ignore
them. More signiﬁcantly, other texts that defend Homeric passages, geographical or otherwise, such as Heraclitus’ Homeric Problems (an allegorical
defense of Homer) and Pseudo-Plutarch’s On the Life and Poetry of Homer
(a systematic demonstration of Homer as the source of all knowledge), make
no mention of this kind of biographical detail.
Polybius, Strabo, and Homer the Historian
If the Vitae and the usual suspects of Homeric criticism fail to provide a
relevant context for Strabo’s Homeric portrait, a glance at the historio22. Aujac and Lasserre 1969, 197. While the Vitae as we have them most likely postdate Strabo, much
of their content derives from a tradition that extends as far back as the sixth century b.c.e.
23. Ps.-Hdt. Vit. Hom. 6. On Homer and his travels in the Lives, see Fairweather 1974, 235–36, and
1983, 326–27 (on the general issue of travel in ancient biographies of poets).
24. Translation in Fairweather 1974, 236; not mentioned in the list provided by Aujac and Lasserre
1969, 197. Fairweather (1974, 236) notes the Thucydidean tinge of Proclus’ argumentation here. This Vita
is much later than Strabo, but I quote it here as an example of a way of thinking about Homer that was
presumably conceivable much earlier.
25. Cf. Polybius’ remarkably parallel comments at 3.58, discussed below.
26. See Graziosi 2002, 125–63, on Homer’s blindness, poverty, and divinity.
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graphical tradition proves more illuminating; after all, historians since
Herodotus had emphasized the importance of travel and personal investigation. But the most direct parallels are found in Polybius, who was the ﬁrst
to systematically discuss such activities as historiographical prerequisites.
While Strabo’s new Homer stands in contrast to traditional biographical
portraits of Homer, his salient qualities of effort, political experience, and
interest in inquiry and knowledge accord remarkably well with the characteristics required of the proper historian as prescribed by Polybius, who
was, after all, one of Strabo’s primary sources and models. And although it
is well known that Polybius took a great interest in Homeric geography (as
evidenced, in a rather circular fashion, by the fragments of Book 34 preserved by Strabo), 27 surprisingly little attention has been paid to Homer’s
presence in his methodological discussions of historiography or to the importance of Polybius’ Homer to that of Strabo.
First of all, let us take a look at Polybius’ famous delineation of the three
essential components of pragmatikh; ¥storÇa. 28 Guido Schepens has proposed that this tripartite deﬁnition (in contrast to the later bipartite division
according to historical technique at 12.27) is based on an evaluation of the
historian’s proper disposition or character. 29 This is, of course, the very aspect
of Homer emphasized by Strabo, and the similarities between this description of the qualities necessary for a historian and Strabo’s characterization
of Homer’s attributes in 1.1.2 are striking on both the conceptual and terminological level (12.25e.1):
. . . tΩn de; merΩn au˚thÅÍ eJno;Í me;n oßntoÍ touÅ perµ th;n ejn to∂Í uÒpomnhvmasi polupragmo
suv nhn kaµ th;n paravqesin thÅÍ ejk touv twn u§lhÍ, eJtevrou de; touÅ perµ th;n qevan tΩn povlewn
kaµ tΩn tovpwn perÇ te potamΩn kaµ limevnwn kaµ kaqovlou tΩn kata; ghÅn kaµ kata; qavlattan
√diwmavtwn kaµ diasthmavtwn, trÇtou de; touÅ perµ ta;Í pravxeiÍ ta;Í politikavÍ . . .
. . . the ﬁrst part of it [history] being the industrious study of written sources and a
comparison of their contents, the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, harbors and
generally the peculiarities of land and sea and the distances between them, and the third
that concerning political actions . . . 30

To Polybius’ ﬁrst and third “parts” perµ th;n polupragmosuvnhn (concerning
eagerness, or, industriousness) in matters of written evidence, and perµ ta;Í
pravxeiÍ ta;Í politikavÍ we can compare Strabo’s praise of the poet’s filopragmosuvnh (a rare word equivalent in this context to polupragmosuvnh) as
well as his insistence on how Homer “had busied himself about deeds” (perµ
ta;Í pravxeiÍ ejspouv dasen) and his “experience of political life” (t¬Å kata;
to;n bÇon ejmpeirÇç to;n politikovn). 31 As for the second, geographical, part of

27. Vercruysse 1990 examines Polybius’ Homeric citations and his critique of Homeric geography in
Book 34. The extent to which Strabo is dependent upon Polybius’ Book 34 continues to be debated; see
Walbank 1956–79, 3:577–79, and most recently Engels 1999, 164–65.
28. On the meaning of this much-debated term, so important to Polybius, see the discussion in Sacks
1981, 178–86.
29. Schepens 1974, following the division laid out in Isnardi 1955; cf. Schepens 1990.
30. Translations of Polybius are from Paton’s Loeb, with modiﬁcations, and with reference to Walbank
1956–79. Greek is cited from Büttner-Wobst’s Teubner.
31. filopragmosuv nh, 1.1.10; political experience, 1.1.2; see discussion above, p. 366.
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history, note the close verbal parallels between Polybius’ text perµ th;n
qevan tΩn povlewn kaµ tΩn tovpwn perÇ te potamΩn kaµ limevnwn kaµ kaqovlou
tΩn kata; ghÅn kaµ kata; qavlattan √diwmavtwn and Strabo’s description of
Homer’s interest in ta; perµ tou; Í tovpouÍ touv Í te kaq’ e§kasta kaµ tou; Í kata;
suv mpasan th;n o√koumevnhn ghÅn te kaµ qavlattan (matters of places, both individually and with regard to the whole inhabited world, land and sea). 32
Strabo, whether consciously or not, appears to have fashioned Homer as
a historian who stands in conformity with Polybius’ prescriptive guidelines,
so that in Strabo’s new vision of the genealogy of the geographical tevcnh
Homer is paradoxically constituted, after the fact, as having anticipated and
served as the model for Polybius’ ideal historian. But Strabo’s re-inscription
of Homer into the historiographical tradition has an even deeper resonance
with Polybius’ work. Homer also ﬁgures prominently in other Polybian discussions of three essential historiographical issues ejmpeirÇa, polupragmosuv nh, and travel that we have identiﬁed as central to Strabo’s vision of the
poet, a correspondence that suggests that Strabo’s Homer perhaps owes a more
extensive debt to the Homer of the Histories.
As is widely recognized, ejmpeirÇa (experience) is one of the Polybian
historian’s most important assets. 33 For Polybius “it is neither possible for
a man without experience [ejmpeirÇan] of military matters to write well about
what goes on in a war, nor for one unversed [to;n mh; pepeiramevnon] in the
practice and circumstances of politics to write well on that subject” (12.25g.1).
Historians without such experience (Timaeus, naturally, is the primary target
here) not only are prone to frequent errors of fact, but also remain unable to
“arouse the interest of their readers” because their writing lacks a certain
“vividness” (eßmfasiÍ, 12.25h.4), likely to be found among only those historians “who have played some part in affairs themselves and made this
aspect of history their own” (to∂Í di’ au˚tΩn peporeumevnoiÍ tΩn pragmavtwn
touÅt o to; mev r oÍ peripepoihmev n oiÍ thÅ Í ¥storÇaÍ, 12.25h.6). 34 Vividness in
writing about politics, war, or even domestic matters, then, usually arises
from participation in, and familiarity with, these activities, even if not necessarily in the speciﬁc events one was actually writing about. 35 Such a stance
is in keeping with Polybius’ general privileging of political and military
experience for those writing history, but when he goes on to provide an
example of such a man, he turns not to a historian, but to Homer (12.25i.1):
The poet is sufﬁcient proof that what I am saying is by no means impossible [o§ti de; to;
legovmenon ou˚k a˚duv naton, ¥kano;n uÒpovdeigma pro;Í pÇstin oJ poihthvÍ], for in his poetry

32. Note the similar language at Strabo 10.3.5, where he speciﬁcally mentions Polybius.
33. On the importance of experience in Greek historiography, see Marincola 1997, 133–36 (and further
pp. 71–75 on Polybius). Both he (p. 73) and Schepens 1970, 173–75, in a stronger formulation, note Polybius’
use of the term ejmpeirÇa in a new, important way, tied speciﬁcally to the historian’s skill in investigation.
34. On the term eßmfasiÍ as used by Polybius, see Schepens 1975.
35. “Hence our predecessors considered that historical memoirs should possess such vividness [de∂n ejn
to∂Í uÒpomnhvmasin uÒpavrcein ejmfavseiÍ] as to make one exclaim when the author deals with political affairs
that he necessarily had taken part in politics and had experience [pe∂ran eßschke] in matters of that sort,
when he deals with war that he had been in the ﬁeld and risked his life, and when he deals with private life
that he had reared children and lived with a wife, and so on regarding the other parts of life” (12.25h.5).

Homer in Strabo’s Geography

371

one sees much of this kind of vividness (par’ å• polu; to; thÅÍ toiauvthÍ ejmfavsewÍ ≥doi tiÍ
a˙n uÒpavrcon].

The implication here is that Homer’s poetry has vividness because Homer was
familiar, as all historians should be, with ta; pravgmata, and versed in worldly
and domestic life in short, because he possessed ejmpeirÇa.
A short while later, the discussion has moved on to polupragmosuv nh
(literally, “curiosity,” but here meaning something closer to “personal investigation”), which “requires great labor and expense [pollhÅÍ talaipwrÇaÍ
kaµ dapavnhÍ] . . . but is the most important part of history [megistovn ejsti
mevroÍ thÅÍ ¥storÇaÍ].” 36 In support of his claim, Polybius quotes passages from
Ephorus and Theopompus asserting the superiority of knowledge gained from
physical presence. But his third authority is Homer (12.27.10):
The poet has spoken even more vividly [ejmfantik∫teron] on this aspect than the others.
When he wishes to set before us the qualities that the man of action [to;n aßndra to;n
pragmatikovn] should possess, he presents the character [to; provswpon] of Odysseus in
these words: “Tell me Muse, of the man of many ways, who was driven far journeys”
[Od. 1.1], and further on, “many were they whose cities he saw, whose minds he learned
of and many the pains he suffered in his spirit on the wide sea” [Od. 1.2 3] and again:
“For I had much to suffer: the wars of men; hard crossing of the big waters” [Od. 8.183].

“It appears to me,” Polybius gravely concludes, “that the dignity of history
demands such a man” (12.28.1). Here, as previously, Homer is implicitly a
man versed in the same ﬁelds and sharing the qualities of the best historians
of the past. While in 12.25, Polybius had turned to Homer as an example
of a historian who achieved an eßmfasiÍ tΩn pragmavtwn that can only be
produced ejk thÅÍ au˚topaqeÇaÍ, locating in the poet the consummate “experienced” writer, he here uses Homer as the crowning example of a series
of historians who emphasize the need for personal inquiry into political and
military affairs. Homer not only is a model for historiographical practice,
but also theoretically reﬂects on this practice in his descriptions of Odysseus. 37
Homer’s remarks, however, are slightly different from those of Ephorus and
Theopompus, who focus on the importance of presence for historical inquiry. 38
The sense from the Odyssey passages is rather that polupragmosuvnh requires
hardship and effort and is closely tied to travel, recalling the references to
personal investigation’s “great labor and expense” with which Polybius had
begun his discussion.
This emphasis on the travel and effort involved in proper historical inquiry
appears again in Polybius’ well-known excursus on geography in 3.56. 39
36. 12.27.6. Again the target is Timaeus and his propensity to read books instead of interrogating witnesses. As if to reiterate the importance of polupragmosuv nh, Polybius repeats the term (or its cognates)
four times in chap. 27.
37. Here Polybius shares with Strabo and the biographers the widespread assumption that Homer’s descriptions of characters could be used as evidence of his own beliefs. Note also that Polybius quotes the very
same lines of the Odyssey as Strabo does in 1.1.16, to prove the same point. These lines, however, are
frequently cited in antiquity and do not necessarily suggest any direct connection between the two authors.
38. See Schepens 1970 on Ephorus’ statement.
39. On Polybius and geography, see Pédech 1964, 588–96; Walbank 1972, 114–29; and the important
analysis of Clarke 1999, 79–97.
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Although he advocates postponing systematic discussion to a separate book
(i.e., 34), Polybius insists that no other ﬁeld is in as much need of correction
or has enjoyed such an increase in knowledge (a sentiment echoed by Strabo
at, e.g., 1.2.1 and 2.5.12). He demonstrates this through a brief speculative
description of the difﬁculties of early exploration somewhat reminiscent
of Thucydides’ “Archaeology”: in earlier times, very few Greeks tried to
“inquire into the ends of the world” (polupragmone∂n ta; kata; ta;Í ejscatiavÍ)
because of the danger. If someone had reached “the boundaries of the world”
(pro;Í ta; pevrata thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ), he could not have seen things with his
own eyes, and even if he had seen them, he couldn’t have received accurate
information about those things due to his inability to speak the local language.
Moreover, even were he to have obtained trustworthy data, he would have
most likely embellished these facts with monsters and marvels. But, Polybius
concludes, we should not criticize those early writers, but praise them for
how much they did manage to learn in less-than-ideal circumstances. Leaving
aside Polybius’ remarkable rhetorical argument and its dizzying series of
counterfactuals, it is difﬁcult, in the light of all that we have been discussing (especially Proclus’ Homeric Vita), not to imagine Homer as the primary
object of this ambivalent apology. Or we might say at least that it would
have been difﬁcult for Strabo, as he was reading this passage, not to have
done so after all, Strabo’s initial portrait uses similar language in emphasizing Homer’s journeys to the ends and boundaries of the world (mevcri tΩn
ejscavtwn au˚thÅÍ [sc. thÅÍ o√koumevnhÍ] peravtwn a˚fÇketo).
Immediately after this passage, Polybius offers a testimonial of his own
intrepid nature, characterizing himself as a traveling geographical inquirer
engaged in a quest for knowledge: “It was in fact with this express object
[to give an accurate description of the world] that I underwent the dangers
and hardships of making journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and
voyages on the sea which adjoins these countries on their western side”
(3.59.7 8). F. W. Walbank has plausibly suggested that Polybius is casting
himself in a Homeric mode here and that the Odyssean model of a wise
wanderer of distant lands, experienced in war and strategy, resonated with
Polybius’ self-conception. 40 One could add that the emphasis here on “dangers
and hardships” recalls (or foreshadows) the “severe labor and great expense”
required by a historian’s “personal investigation” evidenced by the Odyssey
quotations of 12.27.
As even this brief treatment reveals, for Polybius, experience, personal
investigation, travel, and industriousness are closely linked none can stand
on its own (even autopsy, that object of every historian’s desire, remains
useless in Polybius’ eyes if employed by an inexperienced man). The
concept of personal investigation so highly praised in 12.27 naturally binds
together the geographer and the historian (polupragmone∂n, above and at
3.59.4). But I hope to have demonstrated that Polybius’ idea of the proper
historian is constantly informed, implicitly or explicitly, by the ﬁgure of

40. Walbank 1948, 181, somewhat modiﬁed in Walbank 1972, 51–52.
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Homer, even if he is often in the background. In his aspect as a historian,
Homer exempliﬁes the qualities that Polybius holds as essential to his own
work. 41
Strabo’s depiction of Homer in 1.1 thus stems from his reading of Polybius not in the sense of using him as a “source,” but inasmuch as Strabo’s
sense of historical and geographical inquiry owes so much to the Polybian
sensibility. 42 Strabo builds his Homer upon the hints and traces found in the
Polybian text; he makes explicit and expands upon what was only (unconsciously?) suggested in Polybius’ work that Homer was the man who embodied all of the characteristics of the ideal historian and geographer before
they had even been enumerated and systematized by Polybius himself. 43 In
particular, he seems to have come to the conclusion that Homer’s excellence
lay ﬁrst and foremost in the kind of person he was, marked by the historiographical desire that led him to experience life, be a man of action, and spend
considerable effort and expense in travel, all in the pursuit of knowledge. 44
To bring the interplay of Strabo, Homer, Polybius, and geography to a
ﬁtting climax, we might conclude this section with a glance at Strabo’s
description of his own qualiﬁcations as a geographer in the so-called
second introduction at 2.5, a reminiscence of Polybius’ geographical selfcharacterization at 3.59, which we have just examined. Strabo boasts that
“one could not ﬁnd another geographer who has traveled over much more
than I have,” 45 and he backs up his assertion with an itinerary of precisely
where he has traveled (2.5.11). 46 From this declaration of his own love of
travel Strabo turns to his love of knowledge (Homer’s to; filevkdhmon and to;
fileÇdhmon). Just as he had imagined Homer inquiring after places and events
the poet was unable to witness himself, Strabo argues that geographers
(glossed as “serious students” o¥ filomaqe∂Í a favorite term of Polybius
for his ideal audience) must rely, not only on autopsia, but also on secondhand witnesses (2.5.11):
However, the greater part of our material both they and I receive by hearsay [a˚ko¬Å
paralabovnteÍ] and then form our ideas of shape and size and also other characteristics,
qualitative and quantitative, precisely as the mind forms its ideas from sense impres
sions [hJ diavnoia ejk tΩn a√sqhtΩn suntÇqhsi ta; nohtav]. . . . And serious students [o¥
filomaqe∂Í] proceed in just that way, trusting in, just as sense organs [a√sqhthrÇoiÍ],
those who have seen and traveled over places, some here, some there, and form in one
diagram their mental image of the whole inhabited world.
41. It is signiﬁcant that Polybius mentions Homer in the two most important methodological passages
in Book 12. For a lucid reading of the two (which, however, ignores the Homeric references), see Schepens
1974.
42. See Dueck 2000, 47, and Engels 1999 on the methodological similarities between Polybius and Strabo.
43. Of course, Polybius may have made such links explicit elsewhere in the lost portions of his Histories
(e.g., Book 34).
44. As Aujac (1966, 34) notes, the qualities by which Homer surpasses other poets arise directly from
his personality.
45. He clariﬁes this by claiming: “those who have traveled more than I in the western regions have not
covered as much ground in the east” and vice versa, “and the same holds true in regard to the regions to the
south and the north” (2.5.11).
46. 2.5.11: “I have traveled westward from Armenia as far as the regions of Tyrrhenia opposite Sardinia,
and southward from the Euxine Sea as far as the frontiers of Ethiopia.” On Strabo’s travels see Clarke
1999, 240–42; Engels 1999, 26–36; and Dueck 2000, 15–30.
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While Polybius perhaps saw himself as an Odysseus, suffering the perils of
wanderings and war, Strabo seems to envision his own activity more in line
with Homer’s. His gesture towards secondhand witnesses could be seen on
the one hand as an apology for his own dependence on Homeric testimony, but
also accords with the Homeric rather than the Odyssean model of inquiry
Homer did not experience, nor necessarily “see” everything himself (a reference to his blindness?), but nevertheless did his best to learn them by inquiry. After all, Strabo asserts, “he who claims that only those who have seen
[tou;Í √dovntaÍ] have knowledge [e√devnai] destroys the criterion of hearing
[a˚naire∂ to; thÅÍ a˚kohÅÍ krithvrion], which is much more important than sight
for science [h§tiÍ pro;Í ejpisthvmhn ojfqalmouÅ polu; kreÇttwn ejstÇ].” 47
Strabo, Homer, and the Ideal Geographer
Instruction, Beneﬁt, and Erudition (w˚fevleia and polumavqeia)
Near the end of his defense of Homer’s status as the ﬁrst geographer, Strabo
pauses to pardon Homer’s practice of “mixing some mythical things into
those told historically and instructively” (muq∫dh tina; prospevplektai to∂Í
legomevnoiÍ ¥storikΩÍ kaµ didaskalikΩÍ) and to record his disagreement with
Eratosthenes’ claim “that every poet aims at entertainment, not instruction”
(o§ t i poihth; Í paÅ Í stocav z etai yucagwgÇaÍ, ou˚ didaskalÇaÍ, 1.1.10). He
promises to treat the matter in more detail at a later point and spends the
long second chapter of Book 1 (1.2.1 40), the beginning of which I will be
examining below, doing so. But for now I want to point out that these early
references, both to material that Homer narrates didaskalikΩÍ and to his
concern for “instruction” (didaskalÇa), allude to an integral part of Strabo’s
portrait of the poet, which we have not yet considered. Homer, as we recall,
directed his energies toward gaining as much knowledge as possible so that
he might “give an account [of that knowledge] to those who came after
him” (kaµ parad∫sei to∂Í u§ steron ejsomevnoiÍ, 1.1.2). This didactic desire
to transmit the historico-geographical knowledge acquired through travel,
inquiry, and industry to his audience for their beneﬁt is another essential
element in Strabo’s vision of Homer, because, as I will argue, it is so closely
linked to Strabo’s attempt to construct the ideal geographer.
To demonstrate this, we should turn back to 1.1.1, the paragraph immediately preceding the Homeric portrait, where Strabo sets out three reasons
why he believes that geography is “the business of the philosopher” (thÅÍ touÅ
filosovfou pragmateÇaÍ). The ﬁrst is that all previous geographers have been
philosophers; the second, that geography requires polumavqeia (wide learning),
which “belongs to none other than the one who has examined both human
and divine affairs,” i.e., the philosopher; the third, because it aims at a goal
w˚fevleia poikÇlh (multifaceted utility) that “presupposes the same man,
the one who reﬂects upon the art of life” (to;n frontÇzonta thÅÍ perµ to;n bÇon

47. In contrast to Polybius’ interest in autopsy and participation: Engels 1999, 157–65.
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tevcnhÍ, 1.1.1). 48 The rest of 1.1 is devoted to explaining these three claims
as we have seen, his initial concern is to establish Homer as the ﬁrst of the
geographer-philosophers (1.1.2 11); he then moves on to specify the polumavqeia necessary for the geographer (1.1.12 16) and the w˚fevleia that is his
object (1.1.17 23). 49
Strabo’s treatment of w˚fevleia and polumavqeia is essential to understanding
his deﬁnition of geography and has often attracted scholarly interest. 50 The
relationship of these ideals in regard to his conception and interpretation
of Homer, however, has rarely been examined, and then only in the most
general of terms. 51 This is odd, because his methodological remarks seem
to have clear connections both with the portrait of Homer that precedes
them and with the long discussion of Homeric poetry that follows in 1.2. On
the one hand, the lengthy analysis in 1.1.3 11 shows that Homer possessed
wide-ranging knowledge, and the portrait in 1.1.2 speaks of his desire to
transmit this knowledge to posterity. Furthermore, even though Strabo’s subsequent discussion of w˚fevleia and polumavqeia is geared toward constructing
the ideal geographer of his own day, he continues to cite Homer in support
of his arguments, 52 leading one to presume that Homer, as the founder of
geography, would also conform to Strabo’s guidelines. In this light, the
following chapter, 1.2, where Strabo upholds Homer’s geographical knowledge and his poetry’s useful and instructional value against Eratosthenes,
looks like a defense of Homer based precisely on the notions of w˚fevleia and
polumav q eia that Strabo has just been discussing in 1.1.12 23. In what
follows, I want to demonstrate that Strabo’s defense of Homer against
Eratosthenes in 1.2, rather than an independent excursus on poetic interpretation, is part of his larger concern to establish Homer not simply as the ﬁrst
geographer, but as a man who had the same qualiﬁcations and intentions
(w˚fevleia and polumavqeia) as Strabo’s ideal geographer.
Instruction, Polymathy, Experience, and Utility
We should begin by outlining what exactly Strabo means by polumavqeia
and w˚fevleia, which he sees respectively as the prerequisite and objective of
geography. Polumavqeia comprises ﬂuency in both celestial and terrestrial
matters, and in particular a mastery of hJ ejpÇgeioÍ ¥storÇa, that is, knowledge
of “what lives on the earth” (1.1.16). This “wide learning” required of the
geographer corresponds to those things “useful [crhvsima] for the statesman

48. Strabo’s notion of “philosophy”: French 1994, 123–30; Engels 1999, 40–44.
49. See Aujac and Lasserre 1969, 4–11, for a diagrammed breakdown of Strabo’s argument in the Prolegomena (i.e., Books 1–2).
50. Van Paassen 1957, 1–32; Prontera 1984, 211–16; Biraschi 1988; Engels 1999, 90–102; Dueck 2000,
154–64.
51. For instance, Biraschi (1988) reconciles Strabo’s interest in Homer with his deﬁnition of practical
“utility” aimed at statesmen by showing (with especial attention to 2.5.17) how Strabo believes that utility
also demands the inclusion of traditional material such as Homeric geographical information; see further
below in the conclusion.
52. For instance, he speaks in 1.1.16 of the demands that utility places upon a geographer and at 1.1.20
concerning the kind of knowledge with which one should expect a geographer to be familiar.
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and the general,” whom Strabo imagines as his ideal readers (1.1.21). 53
Strabo emphasizes the pragmatic cast of this knowledge; geography, for the
most part, is geared towards political needs (pro;Í ta;Í creÇaÍ ta;Í politikavÍ),
and clearly bears upon the activities of leaders; “for thus they can manage
their affairs in a more satisfactory manner, if they know how large a country
is, how it lies, and what its peculiarities are” (1.1.16). Such a practical utility is the standard by which geography must be measured (mevtron . . . thÅÍ
toiauv thÍ ejmpeirÇaÍ) and is illustrated with a series of examples: the knowledge of the forest is essential to a hunter, just as a sure grasp of the land
is to the leaders of military expeditions. 54 Utility is thus the overarching
aim of the Geography; the geographer should direct his attention to “the
useful” (ta; crhvsima, 1.1.19), and Strabo’s work to; suv ggramma, as he calls
it should be “useful alike to the statesman and the public at large” (de∂ kaµ
politiko;n kaµ dhmwfele;Í oJmoÇwÍ, 1.1.22).
How, then, does such a pragmatic, geographical sense of polumavqeia and
w˚fevleia apply to Homer? In the section immediately following this outline
of the ideal geographer, Strabo begins an extensive critique of his predecessors, from Eratosthenes to Posidonius, that stretches from 1.2 to 2.4. The
ﬁrst item of business, however, is a long and detailed defense of Homer from
Eratosthenes’ contention that “poets aim at entertainment not instruction”
(stocav z esqai yucagwgÇaÍ, ou˚ didaskalÇaÍ, 1.2.3 = frag. 1A.20). 55 Most
scholarship on this part of the Geography treats it as if it were an independent excursus about the purpose of poetry, linked to the long-standing
controversy over poetry’s claims to instruct its readers in everything from
morals and religion to technical knowledge. 56 In his inﬂuential summary
of this debate, Rudolf Pfeiffer reﬂects a long-prevailing attitude, praising
Eratosthenes’ “fearless” and “scientiﬁc” declaration of poetic autonomy, while
dismissing Strabo as a “Stoic ‘convert’ ” determined to defend Homer’s universal wisdom at any cost. 57
To some degree Strabo provides grounds for such a characterization; he
quotes commonplaces of Stoic poetic criticism and occasionally couches his
defense of Homer in moralizing terms. Witness his opening remarks against
Eratosthenes (1.2.3):

53. As Biraschi (1988, 129–32) notes, Strabo envisions readers similar to those that Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes in his Antiquitates Romanae; there are parallels also with Polybius, as is to be expected;
cf. Gabba 1982, 60: “Strabo distinguishes between the specialized scientist and the intelligent political
uses of geographical doctrine.”
54. To put emphasis on the practical beneﬁt of geographical knowledge, Strabo points to famous military
expeditions that failed due to lack of such information, from Agamemnon’s mistaken invasion of Mysia (in
the belief that it was Troy) to Crassus’ disastrous campaign against the Parthians.
55. Eratosthenes’ fragments are cited according to Berger 1880.
56. See Koster 1970, 143–51, on the ancient debate on the purpose of poetry, and Hillgruber 1994, 1:5–35,
on the idea of Homer as the source of all knowledge; cf. Russell 1981, 84–98.
57. Pfeiffer 1968, 154, 166–68; cf. similar comments in the standard handbooks on ancient literary
criticism: Grube 1965, 128; Russell 1981, 42 and 95; Innes 1989, 272. De Lacy (1948) uncritically uses
Strabo as evidence for Stoic poetics; Walbank (1956–79, 3:577) thinks that Strabo sees Homer as the “prototype of the Stoic sofovÍ”; Russell and Winterbottom (1970, 300) introduce their translation of 1.2.3–9 as
“a statement of the Stoic position about the didactic value of poetry. . . .”
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The ancients, in contrast [to Eratosthenes], say that poetry is a sort of primary philosophy,
which is supposed to introduce us to life from our childhood, and teach [didavskousan]
us about character, emotion, and action [hßqh kaµ pavqh kaµ pravxeiÍ] in a pleasurable way
[meq’ hJdonhÅÍ]. My own school [the Stoics] actually said that only the wise man could
be a poet [movnon poihth;n eßfasan eπnai to;n sofovn]. This is why Greek communities give
children their ﬁrst education through poetry [pr∫tista dia; thÅÍ poihtikhÅÍ paideuv ousin],
not for simple entertainment of course, but for moral improvement [ou˚ yucagwgÇaÍ cavrin
dhvpouqen yilhÅÍ, a˚lla; swfronismouÅ ].

First of all, it should be pointed out that Strabo’s moralizing stance in this
passage is not strictly due to his Stoic allegiances (even if it is compatible
with it), since he goes on to attribute this position also to the Pythagoreans
and the Peripatetic Aristoxenus. 58 More signiﬁcant, however, is the incongruity of this introductory passage with the thrust of Strabo’s subsequent
claims. The abrupt transition to the next argument “But even apart from this,
Eratosthenes contradicts himself” (1.2.3) reﬂects the lack of continuity with
the wholly geographically tinged discussion that follows. And indeed, as
Anna Maria Biraschi has observed, Strabo’s “philosophical” justiﬁcations
in this passage do not accord with his actual method of defending Homer in
the latter portions of the chapter (not to mention the rest of the Geography),
where Homer is never interpreted in moralizing terms by Strabo nor imagined
as an ideal Stoic sage, but always treated strictly as a geographer. 59 If Strabo
chooses on occasion to have recourse to such familiar moralizing defenses
of poetry’s instructional value, those comments should not necessarily be
taken as more indicative of his poetic “beliefs” than his more consistent
pragmatic position expressed elsewhere.
As we have seen, Strabo has been envisioning Homer as an exemplar of
historiographical and geographical practice up to this point; any reference
to Homer’s “instructional” or “entertainment” aims should refer primarily
to his work not qua poetry, but qua geography. In fact, this whole section
(1.2.3 40) can be read in a largely geographical context, as directly linked
to the discussion of the ideal geographer in 1.1 and dedicated to proving that
Homer not only knew a lot of geographical, meteorological, and climatic
facts (polumavqeia), but that he intended to pass along this information to his
readers for their practical, rather than moral, beneﬁt (w˚fevleia). A connection
between the didaskalÇa here in 1.2 and the w˚fevleia of 1.1.17 23 is already

58. Plutarch makes virtually the identical claims in Quomodo adul. 1 (14F). See Aly 1957, 376–85, for
a discussion of possible sources. Strabo’s following citation of Od. 3.267–70, on the aoidos left by Agamemnon to watch over Clytemnestra, is likewise paralleled in a wide range of critics (see Gostoli 1986 and
Montanari 2001 on Demetrius of Phalerum). This is not to say that Strabo did not consider himself a Stoic,
nor that his geography is not informed by a Stoic view of the world, but only that his understanding of Homer
is not necessarily representative of or consistent with Stoic poetics (Koster [1970, 144–45] calls it a mixture
of Stoic and Peripatetic thought). On Strabo’s philosophical allegiances, see Aly 1964 and Aujac 1983.
59. Biraschi 1984, 152. The same could be said for some of Strabo’s other excursuses, such as that at
the end of 1.2.5 discussed below, and 1.2.8, which veers off into a theory of myth that is incompatible with
Strabo’s understanding of Homeric myth elsewhere. Following Floratos 1972, 60, Biraschi does, however,
see Strabo’s position as possessing afﬁnities to that of the oldest Stoics, emphasizing the unity of wisdom
and the ties between philosophy, poetry, and science.
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evident in Strabo’s treatment of the ideal geographer at 1.1.15, where he
states that the geographer must present things clearly and use things “for the
purposes of instruction” (pro;Í th;n didaskalÇan) and 1.1.14, where he asks
“how [the geographer] can instruct correctly and adequately [kalΩÍ kaµ
¥kanΩÍ didavskoi] if he has paid no attention, even superﬁcially, to any of these
matters?” 60 These references to the objective and activity of geographers as
“instruction” suggest a close relation with the more explicit geographical
goal of “utility”; in essence, w˚fevleia is the expected result of didaskalÇa.
If we turn to his quarrel with Eratosthenes in 1.2, we witness Strabo
demonstrating the close association of the two terms in his mind when he
mockingly paraphrases Eratosthenes’ original assertion on entertainment
and instruction (1.2.19 = frag. 1A.14):
. . . oJ ∆EratosqevnhÍ . . . fhsi to;n poihth;n bouv lesqai me;n ejn to∂Í prosesperÇoiÍ tovpoiÍ
th;n plavnhn tåÅ ∆Odusse∂ poie∂n, a˚posthÅnai d’ a˚po; tΩn uÒpokeimevnwn ta; me;n ou˚k a˚kribΩÍ
pepusmevnon, ta; de; ou˚de; proelovmenon ou§ twÍ, a˚ll’ ejpµ to; deinovteron kaµ to; teratwdevs
teron e§kasta ejxavgein, touÅ to me;n au˚to; eu® , to; d’ ou• cavrin touÅ t’ ejpoÇei kakΩÍ dexavmenoÍ:
ou˚ ga;r fluarÇaÍ, a˚ll’ w˚feleÇaÍ cavrin.
. . . Eratosthenes says . . . that the poet wished to represent Odysseus’ wanderings in far
western places, but abandoned this scheme, partly having gained inaccurate infor
mation, and partly not even having preferred to be accurate but rather to lead each inci
dent away toward the more awe inspiring and the more marvellous. Now Eratosthenes
understands well what Homer actually did, but wrongly his motive in doing it; it was
not for the sake of nonsense, but for utility.

When Strabo claims that Homer wrote “not for the sake of nonsense, but for
utility” (ou˚ ga;r fluarÇaÍ, a˚ll’ w˚feleÇaÍ cavrin), he is evidently substituting
the terms fluarÇa and w˚fevleia for Eratosthenes’ entertainment (yucagwgÇa)
and instruction (didaskalÇa) (cf. 1.2.18).
This passage also demonstrates that the debate revolved around more than
simply Homer’s knowledge of geographical matters. On most issues, Strabo
and Eratosthenes agree on Homer’s geographical accuracy, but differ over
why he chose to be accurate (ou• cavrin touÅt’ ejpoÇei). Such a divergence over
Homer’s intentions can be located right at the beginning of the dispute in
1.2.3. Eratosthenes, according to Strabo, had admitted that “Homer had
found room in his poetry for what he had found out about Ethiopia and
Egypt and Libya, and went into extraordinary detail on Greece and adjacent
areas . . .” (1.2.3 = frag. 1A.4). Strabo cannot understand how Eratosthenes
admits this yet denies that Homer included such information for instructional purposes. 61 While Eratosthenes sees Homer’s geographical accuracy

60. Geographers are also referred to as “instructing” at 1.1.12: “Hipparchus and Eratosthenes instruct
[didavskei] that it is impossible for any man . . . to attain to the requisite knowledge of geography, without . . .”
61. “Well, is the poet who does this [i.e., introducing correct geographical information] offering entertainment or instruction? Instruction, of course . . .” (povt eron ou® n oJ poiΩn tauÅ ta yucagwgouÅ nti eßoiken h˙
didavskonti; nh; DÇa . . . , Str. 1.2.3); see Meijering 1987, 58–59. I should note that my concern is not with
Eratosthenes’ view of Homeric poetry, but with how Strabo polemically interprets that view.
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as incidental to his poetic aims, it is essential for Strabo not only that Homer
included correct facts, but that he had an instructional, useful goal in mind
as well. Homer, like the ideal geographer, aims at w˚fevleia. 62
The close relation of Homer’s knowledge, instruction, and concern for
utility is best demonstrated by Strabo’s arguments on behalf of Homer’s
instruction in the sections (1.2.3 5) that immediately follow this passage.
Eratosthenes had offered two speciﬁc criticisms: ﬁrst he had asked “what
does it contribute to the excellence of a poet [pro;Í a˚reth;n poihtouÅ ] to have
experience [eßmpeiron] of many places, generalship, farming, rhetoric or whatever it is that people have wanted to secure [peripoie∂n] for him?” (1.2.3 =
frag. 1A.21); he had then gone on to declare that “poetry is a fable-mongering
old woman, to whom it has been allowed to invent . . . whatever she deems
suitable for entertainment” (th;n poihtikh;n gra∫dh muqologÇan a˚pofaÇnwn,
¬• dev d otai plav t tein . . . o¶ a˙ n au˚ t ¬Å faÇnhtai yucagwgÇaÍ o√ke∂on, 1.2.3 =
frag. 1A.19). In his initial response, Strabo concedes that Homer should
not be granted all knowledge, but maintains that Eratosthenes is wrong to
“deprive Homer of so much polumavqeia.” 63 This rephrasing of Eratosthenes’
accusation as a speciﬁc attack on Homer’s polumavqeia suggests that Strabo
is thinking about the argument in terms of his just concluded discussion in
1.1, 64 a suggestion conﬁrmed in Strabo’s vehement conclusion to 1.2.3:
Is no contribution made towards the excellence [ou˚ d e; n sumbav l letai pro; Í a˚r ethv n] of
the poets’ audiences? I mean his having experience of many places [levgw de; to; pollΩn
uÒpavrxai tovpwn eßmpeiron], generalship, farming or rhetoric, which listening, as is likely,
secures [in the audience] [a§per hJ a˚krovasiÍ, . . . wJ Í e√kovÍ, peripoie∂]. 65

Eratosthenes’ criticism of poets’ being “experienced” (eßmpeiroÍ) has struck
a chord with Strabo, for whom, as we have seen, ejmpeirÇa is an essential
part of Homer’s character. 66 Strabo links such knowledge based on “experience” to Homer’s capacity as an instructor at the beginning of 1.2.5,
when he speaks of “the whole educated world which trusts his evidence as

62. Koster (1970, 145) discusses w˚fele∂n in Str. 1.2, but takes it in a moral sense.
63. Strabo remarks that trying “to assign [peripoie∂n] every art and all knowledge [paÅn mavqhma kaµ paÅsan
tevcnhn] to him would be the act of a man whose zeal brings him to grief.” This explicit criticism of the
conception of Homer as the source of all knowledge is another sign that Strabo’s position is more complicated than Pfeiffer and others would have it. In a similar fashion, Strabo thought it ridiculous to assume
that everything, even nonfantastic episodes such as the battle with the suitors, happened in the Odyssey
exactly as described (1.2.11).
64. Cf. 1.2.20: “Again, in the case of the climata and of the winds, Homer displays his wide learning
concerning geography” (to; polumaqe;Í to; perµ th;n gewgrafÇan).
65. As his examples show, Strabo here takes a˚rethv to mean not moral excellence or virtue (as Floratos
1972, 61, claims), but strictly practical skill; Biraschi (1984) sees Strabo’s understanding of a˚rethv differently, as retaining a moral sense separate from the technical notion of “virtue,” a distinction, moreover,
that orthodox Stoics would not have maintained; on this distinction, see also Aujac 1969. Eratosthenes, on
the other hand, seems to be referring to poetic excellence in a more Aristotelian sense, although there is no
way to be sure.
66. Strabo formulates Eratosthenes’ accusation even more clearly at 1.2.12 = frag. 1A.12: “He declares
that all poets are dealers in absurdities [poihthvn te a§panta a˚pofhvnaÍ fluv aron] and thinks that their knowledge either of places or technai [kaµ mhvte tovpwn ejmpeirÇan mhvte tecnΩn] does not conduce to excellence
[pro;Í a˚reth;n sunteÇnein nomÇsaÍ].”
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embodying right judgement on the great contribution to wisdom made by
such experience” (pavnteÍ o¥ pepaideumevnoi mavrturi crΩntai tåÅ poiht¬Å
wÒÍ ojrqΩÍ levgonti perµ touÅ th;n toiauv thn ejmpeirÇan e√Í frovnhsin sunteÇnein
mavlista).
The focus on “experience” lies at the heart of the next argument as well
and connects Homer’s polumavqeia with his concern for w˚fevleia. At 1.2.5,
Strabo maintains that there is no “poetic excellence” (a˚reth;n poihtouÅ)
better than Homer’s “skill to represent life by the medium of words” (th;n
mimhtikh;n touÅ bÇou dia; lovgwn). This mimetic talent, however, is explicitly
tied to Homer’s life experience in a formulation reminiscent of Polybius:
“How,” Strabo asks, “can [Homer] represent [mimo∂to], if he is inexperienced
in life [aßpeiroÍ w˙ n touÅ bÇou] and foolish?” 67 Moreover, Homer’s unparalleled
mimetic ability is assumed to have “utility” as its goal; in another paraphrase
of Eratosthenes, Strabo wonders how a poet so skillful at representation
could be “only capable of bewitching and cajoling [gohteuv ein movnon kaµ
kolakeuv ein] his audience and not beneﬁting them [w˚fele∂n de; mhdevn]?” The
language of this section (polumavqeia, eßmpeiroÍ, aßpeiroÍ, w˚fele∂n) indicates
that we are indeed still in the conceptual realm of the intrepid Homer and
the ideal geographer. Seen in this light, even Strabo’s Stoicizing aphoristic
remark at the conclusion of 1.2.5 that only a good man can be a good
poet (ou˚c o∏ovn te a˚gaqo;n genevsqai poihth;n mh; provteron genhqevnta aßndra
a˚gaqovn) could be taken in a more “technical” way, rather than as an example
of his moralizing tendencies. The excellence of a poet, as we have seen,
refers to his mimetic, not his moral, excellence; since mimetic ability is the
result of experience, the “poet” and the “man” are “good” inasmuch as they
are experienced. 68
Strabo’s opening remarks in 1.2.3 5, then, answer Eratosthenes’ general
questioning of Homer’s knowledge and instructive intent as if he were speciﬁcally impugning the polumavqeia and w˚fevleia proper to the geographer.
In this light, Strabo’s positing of entertainment and instruction as Homer’s
goals, his pragmatic sense of “utility,” and his vigorous defense of Homeric
didaskalÇa have a consistent basis in his understanding of Homer’s role as
an ideal geographer. 69 When Eratosthenes casts doubt on Homer’s concern
for “instruction,” he undermines Homer’s fulﬁllment of the “utility” that forms
the ideal geographer’s primary goal. Eratosthenes’ attack on Homer thus goes
to the heart of Strabo’s conception of himself and his own geographical

67. Halliwell (2002, p. 270, with n. 21) sees this as an implicit response to Pl. Resp. 10.598–600, presumably transmitted via Hellenistic sources.
68. Alternatively, one could see the last sentence of 1.2.5, in which Strabo, backtracking, differentiates
poetic virtue from that of a carpenter, “which depends on no inherent nobility or dignity, whereas the excellence of a poet is inseparably associated with the excellence of the man himself,” as another of Strabo’s
attempts to frame his arguments in Stoicizing terms that are nevertheless starkly incompatible with his focus
on Homer’s technical knowledge and experience.
69. Strabo devotes 1.2.8–9 to developing his idea of Homer’s dual purpose of entertainment and instruction with his well-known excursus on the origins of myths, while much of the ensuing discussion of
Odysseus’ wanderings (1.2.10–19) further explicates Strabo’s method of separating “entertaining myth”
from “instructive history” in counterpoint to Eratosthenes and Polybius.
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project; Strabo’s defense, while far from satisfactory in its frequent digressions, confusions, and prolixity, is not simply a long-winded apology for
Homer’s knowledge of geography, but a defense of the principles of geography itself as embodied in the founder of the science. For Strabo being a
proper geographer is not simply a matter of getting the facts right, but
having the right attitude; as a result Eratosthenes’ claim that Homer had
no concern for instruction and did not even have the experience and knowledge to impart such instruction had to be refuted at all costs.
YucagwgÇa, didaskalÇa, and w˚fevleia in Historiography
Strabo’s debate with Eratosthenes can thus be seen as deeply connected to his
ideas about Homer and geography. This should not really come as a surprise.
Although many scholars have recognized that the language employed by
Strabo and Eratosthenes yucagwgÇa, didaskalÇa, w˚fevleia is paralleled
in ancient literary criticism, we should remember that Strabo’s argument with
Eratosthenes takes place in a geographical context. Like Strabo, Eratosthenes
had made his comments on poetry in the ﬁrst book of his Geographica, not
in his philological work. 70 In fact, the only writers other than Strabo to
mention any of Eratosthenes’ allegedly “famous” bons mots on poetry are
Hipparchus and Polybius, who were both responding to Eratosthenes’ Geography, and who, moreover, are preserved only in Strabo. The closest allusion
to, or reformulation of, Eratosthenes’ statement occurs in another geographical
work, Agatharchides of Cnidus’ On the Erythraean Sea: “Every poet aims
at entertainment rather than truth” (paÅ Í poihth; Í yucagwgÇaÍ maÅ l lon h˙
a˚lhqeÇaÍ ejstµ stocasthvÍ). 71 Whatever their origin or relation to literarycritical discussions, Eratosthenes’ comments thus seem to have been primarily targeted at and received by those interested in Homeric geography. 72
But Strabo was a historian before he became a geographer, and, as we have
seen in the ﬁrst half of this article, he owes much of his picture of Homer
to historiographical terms and concepts. I want to close this section by exploring the possibility that Strabo’s ideas about Homeric instruction, utility,
and entertainment owe something to discussions of these notions in historiographical discourse. After all, Strabo explicitly declares that the Geography
can be compared to his History, which he similarly conceives as “useful”
(crhvsima), 73 and his emphasis on geography’s utility derives from historiography, where it had become virtually de rigueur to proclaim the usefulness

70. Geus (2002, 264–67), who perhaps goes too far in removing Eratosthenes from the ﬁeld of literary
debate completely: “the single statement in the Geographica suggests an exaggerated formulation, rather
than a carefully thought-out debate with older and contemporary philologists . . . the so-called Dichtungstheorie of Eratosthenes is scarcely more than an empty formula” (p. 267).
71. Agatharchides frag. 8 = Phot. Bibl. 250.8, 444b. See Fraser 1972, 548, and Verdin 1990.
72. This is not to say that literary-critical principles stated by geographers have no relation to formulations
of those working on Homeric or poetic criticism (like Aristarchus and Crates, who also often weighed in
on Homeric geography, or Philodemus), only that they necessarily are adapted to the geographical context
of the discussion.
73. 1.1.23. Strabo envisions a similar audience for both works: the Geography “is addressed to the
same class of readers and particularly to men of exalted stations in life” (1.1.23) as his historical work.
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of one’s work since the days of Thucydides. 74 The “utility” of history, however, could be construed in a number of different ways. Diodorus, for instance,
speaks of his history’s usefulness in a moral sense, 75 and the primary “utility”
of history for Dionysius of Halicarnassus seems to have lain in its ability to
provide exempla for rhetorical speeches. 76 Strabo’s “practical” idea of utility,
however, is indebted to Polybius, 77 who not only consistently takes w˚fevleia
in a similarly pragmatic fashion, but also repeatedly stresses the practical
beneﬁt of his history to his readers. 78
Polybius also provides the best parallels for Strabo’s vocabulary of entertainment, instruction, and utility. Compare his famous formulation of the
difference between tragedy and history (2.56.11 12):
The tragic poet should thrill and entertain his audience for the moment [ejkplhÅxai kaµ
yucagwghÅsai kata; to;n paro;n tou; Í a˚kouv ontaÍ] by very persuasive speeches, but the
historian should instruct and persuade serious students [didav x ai kaµ pe∂sai tou; Í
filomaqouÅ ntaÍ] for all time by true facts and speeches, since in the one case it is the
probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion
in spectators [dia; th; n a˚ pav thn tΩn qewmevnwn], in the other it is the truth, the purpose
being to confer beneﬁt on serious students [dia; th;n w˚fevleian tΩn filomaqouv ntwn].

Polybius’ parallel sentence structure sets up an opposition between the tragic
poets’ concern to ejkplhÅxai kaµ yucagwghÅsai and the historians’ to didavxai
kaµ pe∂sai as well as their respective purposes: a˚pavth and w˚fevleia. We thus
have yucagwgÇa arrayed on the one side and w˚fevleia and didaskalÇa on the
other in a fashion that corresponds with Strabo’s usage. 79 While this example
assigns one set of terms to tragedy and the other to history, Polybius uses
yucagwgÇa and w˚fevleia similarly when he is talking about history on its own;
for instance, during his criticism of Timaeus, he explains that historians
must supply both facts and explanations, “for the mere statement of a fact
may entertain us but is of no beneﬁt to us” (ej p eµ yilΩÍ legov m enon au˚ t o;
to; gegono;Í yucagwge∂ mevn, w˚fele∂ d’ ou˚devn, 12.25b.2). 80 In the same vein,
Polybius asserts elsewhere that the study of causes is “what at one and the

74. Thuc. 1.22.4: “it will be sufﬁcient if those wishing to have a clear idea of the past as an aid to the
interpretation of the future . . . judge my history as useful [w˚fevlima]”; for the evidence, Avenarius 1956,
22–26.
75. Diodorus, writing shortly before Strabo, deﬁnes history as a˚kÇndunon didaskalÇan (risk-free instruction) that aims to present tΩn crhsÇmwn, “useful” things (1.1). See Sacks 1990, 23–35, for a nuanced treatment of Diodorus’ particular understanding of moral utility and its relation to that of Ephorus.
76. Although cf. Pomp. 6.734, cited below. For Dionysius, see Verdin 1974.
77. Prontera 1984, 211–16; Biraschi 1988; Dueck 2000, 47 and 162. On Polybius’ “pragmatic” attitude,
see Walbank 1990 and Sacks 1981, 133–44; on Strabo’s notion of utility in relation to Polybius, see Dueck
2000, 47–48; and Biraschi 1988 on Strabo, Polybius, and Dionysius.
78. E.g., Polybius’ sort of “political history” is w˚felim∫taton at 9.2.6 and history’s telos is wÒfevleia at
15.36.3. See Sacks 1981, 120–44, on utility in Polybius (list of occurences of wj fel- words: p. 122, n. 1);
his analysis of the beneﬁt stemming from the proper use of emphasis provides another link between utility,
history, and Homer, whom Polybius sees as particularly skilled at emphasis.
79. Cf. Meijering 1987, 10–11.
80. Cf. 11.19a.2: “the results of actions only entertain [yucagwge∂] one’s audience, while the anticipation
of what is to follow, when investigated properly, beneﬁts serious students [w˚felouÅ si tou;Í filomaqouÅ ntaÍ].”
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same time delights and beneﬁts serious students” (to; yucagwgouÅ n a§ma kaµ
th;n w˚fevleian ejpifevron to∂Í filomaqouÅ si, 6.2.8).
In each of these cases, Polybius shows that the conceptual pairing of
yucagwgÇa and w˚fevleia had historiographical currency, but the last quote
also indicates that Strabo’s compromise claim that Homer strove both to
instruct and to entertain could directly apply to historiographical activity
here to the study of historical causes. Strabo’s formulation, however, has
always been treated as part of the history of poetic criticism, in which the
dual view of poetry’s requirement to beneﬁt and delight has a long history. 81
Many scholars have pointed out the similarity of Strabo’s position with those
of Neoptolemus of Parium (third or second century b.c.e.) and, to a lesser
extent, Heraclides Ponticus (fourth century b.c.e.), criticized in Philodemus’
On Poems 5, written not long before Strabo’s time. Both Heraclides and
Neoptolemus seem to have subscribed to a version of Strabo’s thesis that a
poet both pleases and instructs, in language that corresponds to Strabo’s. 82
But as Philodemus’ criticisms of both writers demonstrates, neither speciﬁed
precisely what sort of beneﬁt is bestowed by a poet’s instructive objectives;
Strabo’s narrowing of the scope to practical geographical utility demonstrates
that even if he was aware of such work, he has elaborated it for his own particular purposes. 83 Moreover, Polybius’ remarks quoted above show that the
linking of entertainment and utility was already so familiar that it could be
used of virtually any activity (e.g., studying causes or historical facts), rather
than poetry per se. 84
So Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a contemporary of Strabo, conceives
of Theopompus’ historical work as having the same dual objective: “And
nobody should suppose that this is purely for entertainment [yucagwgÇan]:
this is not the case, but the material contained in it is virtually all for our
beneﬁt [w˚ f ev l eian]” (Pomp. 6.4). Polybius also identiﬁes two “ends”
(tevlh) w˚fevleia and tevryiÍ for all intellectual pursuits, but especially
history (15.36.3), and frequently lists utility and pleasure as the two ends of

81. See, e.g., Hor. Ars. P. 333–34; 343–44. Cf. Pl. Resp. 10.607d: “not only pleasant but also beneﬁcial
for states and human life” (ou˚ movnon hJde∂a a˚lla; kaµ w˚felÇmh pro;Í ta;Í politeÇaÍ kaµ to;n bÇon to;n a˚nqr∫pinon).
Earlier Plato differentiates between moral and technical utility, and requires only the moral kind of the
poet (10.599b–d).
82. Neoptolemus’ formulation, though fragmentary, is closest to Strabo’s, and has often been compared
to it: “. . . for the perfect poet along with his entertaining qualities to beneﬁt his hearers and tell them
useful things, and that Homer . . .” (t]åÅ teleÇå poi[ht¬Å met]a; thÅÍ yucagw[gÇ]a[Í th;n tΩn] a˚kouovntw[n]
w˚[fevlhsi]n kaµ crhsi[mo]l[ogÇa]n kaµ to;n £Omhr[on . . . , Philodemus On Poems 5, col. xvi.9–15 Mangoni;
trans. Armstrong 1995). Note that Mangoni’s text is signiﬁcantly different from Jensen’s, usually cited in
this context. In fact, although the dating of both writers remains uncertain, many (Pfeiffer 1968, 166–67;
Meijering 1987, 6; Kennedy 1989, 206) have assumed that Neoptolemus’ remarks are a direct riposte to
Eratosthenes. As my earlier remarks demonstrate, I believe this to be unlikely. Heraclides seems to have
espoused an almost identical position as Neoptolemus and also to have required the poet to know geography
(Philodemus On Poems 5, col. v. 27 Mangoni). See Asmis 1995 for a lucid attempt to reconstruct the positions
of Heraclides, Neoptolemus, and Philodemus.
83. Asmis 1995, 149–51.
84. In fact, the formulation might have been older; cf. Halliwell (2002, pp. 269–70, n. 19), who points
to some lesser known possible parallels: Isoc. 2.49 and 9.10, [Pl.] Minos 321a, Timocles frag. 6.6 PCG.
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history. 85 Roos Meijering’s pithy appraisal of Strabo’s view of Homer
namely, that his “ﬁnal goal is didaskalÇa, or, in other words, to; tevrpein
must serve to; w˚fele∂n” could reasonably be Polybius’ appraisal of his
own historical work. 86 At 1.2.18 Strabo even describes Homer’s “utility” as
historical: “we should neither scrutinize rigorously Homer’s stories of . . .
Scylla, Charybdis, and Aeolus nor set them aside as baseless and . . . as
having no claim to truthfulness or to historical utility” (a˚lhqeÇaÍ mhde;n
prosaptovmena mhd’ w˚feleÇaÍ ¥storikhÅÍ). These parallels suggest that Strabo’s
thinking about the relation between beneﬁt, instruction, and entertainment
and his notion of Homer’s dual objectives resonate as much with historians’
formulation of history’s purpose as with the literary-critical discussion of
poetry’s. After all, while Strabo acknowledges that Homer was indeed a poet,
we have seen that he consistently treats him as a historian and geographer:
a man who “looks to the same end as the historian and the one speaking
the facts” (pro; Í de; to; au˚ t o; tev l oÍ tåÅ ¥storikåÅ kaµ tåÅ ta; oß n ta lev g onti
blevpwn, 1.2.9). 87
Conclusion
Strabo’s decision to focus on Homer’s historico-geographical zeal and his
instructional objectives takes on an essential role in his own work that goes
beyond simply acknowledging Homer’s position as both “author of the ﬁrst
and greatest periegetic composition,” and the founder of geography. 88 The
Geography constitutes Strabo’s attempt to forge a new type of universal
geography to describe the changed world of the late Hellenistic period. In
doing so he builds upon the geographical literature of the past periegeses,
universal histories, mathematical geographies while disavowing the ability
of any one of those to adequately treat his more expansive understanding of
geography, one which is simultaneously historical, descriptive, and normative.
Strabo’s work dictates both what geography has been and what it must be,
both who geographers were in the past and who they must be in the future. 89
Within such a framework, I propose, Strabo pays so much attention to
sketching Homer’s attitude and intentions because he is making a conscious
effort to renew the tradition by “returning” to the Homeric model of inquiry,
not only in terms of content both geographical and historical in equal

85. In 1.4.11, he says that only by studying universal history can we “receive to; crhvsimon kaµ to; terpno;n
from history,” and at 7.7.8, he describes an episode of his work as “more pleasurable [hJdÇwn] to those fond
of tales [filhkovoiÍ] and more useful [crhsim∫teroÍ] to those who want to learn.” Moreover, just as in
Strabo, the pleasure or entertainment of history is usually subordinate to its utility. On Polybius’ views of
this matter, see Walbank 1990.
86. Meijering 1987, 6.
87. Strabo does of course realize that Homer was a poet; he argues, however, in 1.2.6–8 that he only
wrote in verse because prose did not yet exist. Space precludes me from discussing the difﬁcult question
of the place of myth in Strabo’s conception of Homeric composition, which to some extent is the content
that corresponds to the goal of entertainment or pleasure in history and poetry. I hope to do so in a future
contribution.
88. Clarke 1999, 334.
89. Prontera 1984, 211–16; cf. Clarke 1999, 294–99.
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measure but in terms of the coherence bestowed upon that content by the
character of the inquirer. 90 To cast doubt on Homer’s accuracy, then, would
also call into question Homer’s desire for truth. I hope to have shown that
a consistent portrait of Homer lies behind Strabo’s use of Homeric poetry in
the Geography, depicting a man who, in his zeal for travel, knowledge, and
instruction bears a great resemblance both to the model historian outlined
by Polybius in his Histories and to the ideal geographer set out by Strabo in his
preface. Even his lengthy defense of Homer from Eratosthenes’ accusations
can be seen as part of this vision, through its emphasis on Homer’s concern
for the utility so central to Strabo’s conception of both historical and geographical inquiry. Strabo insists not only that Homer was correct, but that he
wanted to be correct, not only that he was content to hear about things, but
that he had made an effort to verify such information and to pass it on to his
audience. Such a conception of Homer lies at the heart of Strabo’s deployment of Homeric poetry as evidence throughout the rest of the Geography and
suggests an attitude very different from that of other ancient Homeric exegetes,
who posit Homer’s words as a priori authoritative or “scriptural,” whether in
moral, scientiﬁc, or other terms. Homer retains his authoritative status, but
is given occupational speciﬁcity Strabo envisions a Homer endowed with
all the qualities of the best historian and geographer, and this fashioning of
Homer in his own image is a striking testament to the poet’s continuing
power in Greek intellectual life.
James Porter has pointed out how Homer’s canonicity in Western culture
has always strangely been tied to his lack of identity; the mystery surrounding
this founder of literature has made him something of a blank slate on which
people can project their own fantasies, desires, or fears. 91 While Homer’s
status and centrality compelled writers, poets, and artists to grapple with him,
his fundamental emptiness meant that those who came after him were free
to imagine him in ways suited to their intellectual projects, whether casting
him as authority or disavowing him. Each of these treatments, however, is
necessarily particular and different because Homer himself was not a stable
identity. Furthermore, as Barbara Graziosi’s Inventing Homer has demonstrated, writers who discussed and constructed Homer’s life were necessarily engaged in interpretive interventions because the details of Homer’s
life could only be inferred from his poetry, to write Homer’s biography was
also to say something about his poetry. 92 For Strabo, as for every ancient
author who thought about Homer, the poet was not a static ﬁgure with stable
characteristics inherited from tradition; to properly engage with Homer meant
taking a stance as to who he was, what he stood for to construct an image
of Homer out of his poetry, the biographical lore, and one’s own desire. 93
University of Texas at Austin
90. Cf. Bruno Sunseri 1997 on Ephorus’ “return to Homer.”
91. Porter 2002.
92. Graziosi 2002.
93. I would like to thank Jim Porter and Egbert Bakker for reading and commenting on an early version
of this article.
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